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Schopenhauer's Deconstruction of German Idealism 
 
Sebastian Gardner 
 
Introduction 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer occupies a central position in the narrative of nineteenth-century philosophy: 
though first and foremost an idealist, Schopenhauer belongs also to its naturalistic current, and with 
regard to many other central tendencies of the age – including the turn towards the practical, at the 
expense of the early modern image of man as reality-reflecting reason, the elevation of art to a 
position of near parity with philosophy, and the exploration of proxies for traditional religion – 
Schopenhauer again occupies a pivotal role; in a way that deserves to be found puzzling, 
Schopenhauer provides the key connecting link of Kant with Nietzsche.1 My aim here is to consider 
                                                     
1 The main broad feature of nineteenth-century thought not exhibited by Schopenhauer – and which 
he in fact opposes vigorously – is its historical turn: see The World as Will and Representation [1st 
edn. 1819; 2nd edn., revised and enlarged, 2 volumes, 1844], 2 vols., trans. E. F. J. Payne (New 
York: Dover, 1969), Vol. I, pp. 273–274. Further references to this work are abbreviated WWR, 
followed by volume and page number. References to other writings of Schopenhauer's are given by 
the following abbreviations and are to the editions cited below: 
BM  Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals [1840], in The Two Fundamental  
Problems of Ethics, trans. David E. Cartwright and Edward E. Erdmann 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
FR  On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [1st edn. 1813,  
2nd edn. 1847], 2nd edn. trans. E. F. J. Payne (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 
1974). 
FW  Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will [1839], in The Two Fundamental  
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Schopenhauer's philosophy from the perspective of German Idealism, an approach which, I will try 
to show, takes us to the heart of his project and allows us to understand how a philosopher only one 
step removed from the philosophy of the Enlightenment could provide crucial impetus to late 
modern anti-rationalism. 
 Some preliminary remarks are needed concerning this contextualization. Schopenhauer's 
intention was not of course to provide simply a critique of German Idealism, but rather to present a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Problems of Ethics, trans. David E. Cartwright and Edward E. Erdmann 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
MREM  Manuscript Remains: Early Manuscripts (1804–1818), ed. Arthur Hübscher,  
trans. E. F. J. Payne, Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes, Vol. 1 (New 
York: Berg, 1988). 
MRCD  Manuscript Remains: Critical Debates (1809–1818), ed. Arthur Hübscher,  
trans. E. F. J. Payne, Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes, Vol. 2 (New 
York: Berg, 1988). 
PP  Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays [1851], 2 vols.,  
trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). 
VgP  Vorlesung über die gesammte Philosophie d.i. Die Lehre vom Wesen der  
Welt und von dem menschlichen Geiste. In vier Theilen. Erster Theil: Theorie 
des gesammten Vorstellen, Denkens und Erkennens, in Theorie des 
gesammten Vorstellens, Denkens und Erkennens. Aus dem handschriftlichen 
Nachlaß [1820], hrsg. u. eingeleitet von Volker Spierling (München: Piper, 
1986). 
WN  On the Will in Nature: A Discussion of the Corroborations from the  
Empirical Sciences that the Author's Philosophy has Received Since its First 
Appearance [1836], ed. David E. Cartwright, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: 
Berg, 1991). 
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self-standing, independently intelligible system, the grounds of which are contained in basic facts of 
consciousness and accessible to anyone who is able and willing to reflect on these in the unobscured 
light of Kant's first Critique. Nor again is Schopenhauer's target – the world-view he intends his 
system to confute – identified narrowly with the positions of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel: it 
comprises, much more broadly, the dominant tendency operative within all the major schools of 
Western philosophy, namely, their directedness towards an optimistic solution to the riddle of the 
existence of the world. 
 It is possible, therefore, to detach Schopenhauer's philosophy from all consideration of 
German Idealism, or to consider it, as much commentary does, only in relation to Kant and 
Nietzsche, but there are sound reasons for instead understanding his system abreactively – as in the 
first instance an attempt to simultaneously undermine, appropriate, and recast the legacy of German 
Idealism. It is a matter of historical record that Schopenhauer in the earliest years of his 
philosophical formation had extensive exposure to the lectures and writings of Fichte and Schelling, 
with whom he engages more closely in his early notebooks than with any other figures in the 
history of philosophy with the exception of Kant.2 Approaching Schopenhauer with this in mind 
allows better sense to be made of Schopenhauer's ideas than can be got simply by placing them 
directly alongside Kant's, Schopenhauer's departures from whom often seem oddly under-
motivated:3 Schopenhauer's return to Kant is a return from German Idealism, conducted in light of 
                                                     
2 On Schopenhauer's early years, see Arthur Hübscher, The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context: Thinker against the Tide, trans. Joachim T. Baer and David E. Cartwright 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1989), Chs. 5–6, and David E. Cartwright, Schopenhauer: A 
Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Ch. 4. 
3 Christopher Janaway, in Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 141–142, similarly affirms the need to set Schopenhauer in historical 
context in order to understand his departures from Kant. For analyses of Schopenhauer's 
epistemology and metaphysics, see, in addition to Janaway, Julian Young, Willing and Unwilling: A 
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its misconstrual (as he perceives it) of Kant's thought. It is of course in relation to Kant alone that 
Schopenhauer asks for his system to be considered, but we can understand without difficulty the 
reasons why Schopenhauer would have wished to write German Idealism out of his philosophical 
ancestry.4 German Idealism represents for Schopenhauer the culmination of the optimistic tendency 
of Western philosophy and theology, which it equips with the most advanced modern articulation,5 
its distinctive historical position consisting in its having recognized the profound and original 
advance made by Critical philosophy yet perversely refused to grasp its anti-optimistic vector.6 
Finally, Schopenhauer's central metaphysical claims allow themselves to be understood as 
negations of key claims in German Idealism. 
 Schopenhauer's philosophy represents, I therefore suggest, the result of an attempt to as it 
were re-run the post-Kantian development – the attempt beginning in the 1790s to fix Kant's 
problems – on the basis of a rejection of two crucial assumptions of Fichte and Schelling. The first 
of these is their reaffirmation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), to which they grant 
unrestricted scope and authority. The second concerns the value of our existence and that of the 
world, which is held, following Kant, to be secured by the moral Fact of Reason, meaning that 
value in general is grounded on freedom and enters the world primordially through the exercise of 
pure practical reason. On the basis of his controversion of these two fundamental assumptions, 
Schopenhauer inverts the significance of the concepts which he, completing his own extension of 
Kant's philosophy, borrows from Fichte and Schelling. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987) and Schopenhauer 
(London: Routledge, 2005), and John E. Atwell, Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The 
Metaphysics of Will (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). 
4 As he does explicitly at WWR I, 416, and PP I, 132. 
5 WWR II, 644–645: all German Idealism is Spinozistic, and therefore optimistic. 
6 See MREM, 13: Kant exposed the contradictions in the lie which is life. 
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 The net result is a system which has much of the formal structure and outward appearance of 
the German Idealist systems but a directly contrary import. Schopenhauer does not quite affirm the 
thoroughly disenchanted view of the world that the German Idealists attempted to show need not be 
accepted as the price of modernity, but the residue of enchantment which he allows to continue to 
attach to our existence is relocated outside the objectual world, in the form of its negation: the world 
itself inherits the 'nothingness', the 'lack of an ultimate purpose or object' and 'absence of all aim', of 
its metaphysical ground.7 Though Schopenhauer officially repudiates the Spinozistic nihilism that 
F. H. Jacobi warns of as the inevitable upshot of Kantianism8 – on the somewhat thin basis that his 
doctrine of the negation of the world endows it with (inverted) moral-metaphysical significance9 – 
his proximity to it can hardly be exaggerated: Schopenhauer reaffirms Spinoza's anti-theism, 
determinism, materialist tendency, naturalistic view of human motivation, and reductionist account 
of value. 
 
I.  Schopenhauer's strategy 
 
1. Contraction of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
 
                                                     
7 WWR I, 149, 164. 
8 The 'notion that the world has merely a physical, and no moral, significance is the most deplorable 
error that has sprung from the greatest perversity of mind' (PP II, 102). Schopenhauer distinguishes 
his position from the 'Neo-Spinozism' described by Jacobi at WWR II, 645–646. 
9 See Schopenhauer's claim to have solved the age-old problem of demonstrating 'a moral world-
order as the basis of the physical', WWR II, 590–591. 
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The first part of Schopenhauer's strategy is presented in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason, his first publication and a work to which he frequently refers back, declaring its 
conclusions to be presupposed by the argument of WWR.10 
 Fourfold Root presents itself in the first instance as a historical review conjoined with a 
systematic analysis of PSR, but it is clear from the outset that it is not intended as a neutral account 
of the different ways in which PSR has been invoked or may be understood. The work's chief 
concern is to show, negatively, that confusions of different senses of ground or reason (Grund) have 
played a decisive role in metaphysical reasoning, and, positively, to offer a radically original, 
minimal account of the principle's content.11 Schopenhauer identifies PSR with the conjunction of 
four principles: (i) the law of causality, requiring changes in real objects to have efficient causes; 
(ii) the condition on true judgement, that it have a ground outside itself; (iii) the mutual 
determination of all parts of space and time; and (iv) the law of motivation governing acts of will. 
Characteristically metaphysicians have confused the first two, especially in proofs of God's 
existence, reflecting their illicit conviction that the order of things is in essence that of thought.12 
 The full force of Schopenhauer's devaluation of PSR becomes clear in his nominalist answer 
to the question whether it constitutes one principle or many. Though drawn at times to talk of a 
unitary Grund 'presenting itself in a fourfold aspect',13 ultimately Schopenhauer rejects the notion of 
a 'ground in general', einen Grund überhaupt,14 reducing PSR to an aggregate and leaving no scope 
                                                     
10 E.g. WWR I, xiv. 
11 The critical intention becomes more pronounced in the amplified second edition of 1847, but is 
clear even in the first (1813). 
12 FR 14–16, 18–19, 228–229. 
13 FR, 162–163, 232. 
14 FR, 234. See also FR, 2–4, 231; WWR II, 641; and VgP, 494. I discuss Fourfold Root in more 
detail in Sebastian Gardner, 'Schopenhauer's Contraction of Reason: Clarifying Kant and Undoing 
German Idealism', Kantian Review 17, 2012, 375–401, Section 3. 
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for the formation of a novel, non-empirical conception of Grund such as those freely employed by 
the German Idealists.15 The concept of reason in general or as such becomes a mere abstraction; 
what unifies the four principles is simply their fundamental character and epistemic immanence, 
i.e., our knowledge of them as constituting the form of objects within the world as representation. It 
follows that PSR extends only to the phenomenon, not to the thing in itself or 'inner essence' of 
things, to which it is entirely 'foreign'.16 The implications of its contraction are, as Schopenhauer at 
one place spells them out: that 'the laws of the faculty of reason are not absolute laws'; that 'there is 
just as little unconditioned as conditioned, just as little God as world'; that the question how the 
world and nature have arisen can be likened to 'the talking of one who is still half in a dream'; and 
that in the realm beyond nature 'there is really no why and no wherefore'.17 
 Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR goes hand in hand with his concept empiricism, 
according to which concepts arise only from intuitive representations, formed by abstraction from 
immediately given data in much the way that British empiricism tells us.18 This avoids returning us 
to Hume's denial of all objective necessity, as an orthodox Kantian might object, because on 
Schopenhauer's account experience itself – intuitive representation, in his terminology – contains 
seams of necessity, defined by the four sub-forms of PSR.19 Where Schopenhauer departs from 
                                                     
15 See FR, 234. 
16 E.g. WWR I, 128, 163; WWR II, 579; PP II, 94. 
17 MRCD, 430–431. 
18 '[I]f we wish to call any concept objective, then it must be one which demonstrates its origin and 
object in sensuous feeling (the five senses)' (MRCD, 357); 'concepts have no meaning other than 
their relation to intuitive representations (whose representatives they are)' (MRCD, 471). See also 
FR, 15, 146–148; WWR I, 39–42; and MRCD, 298–299, 468. 
19 To clarify their relation: Schopenhauer's account of PSR does not presuppose and is not argued 
for via his concept empiricism. Schopenhauer's concept empiricism, however, is not independent of 
his account of PSR, since this is presupposed by his account of the intuitive representations from 
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Kant is in his claim is that no independently originating concepts are brought to the data of intuition 
or are required to make possible cognition of objects. And this denial of the pre-existence of 
concepts in any form, along with the impossibility of forming new concepts not already implicated 
in PSR-structured experience, is taken by Schopenhauer to entail the strict meaninglessness of any 
employment of concepts outside the domain of representation. The scope which Kant allowed to 
remain for employment of the unschematized categories – to provide the necessary foundation for 
our thought of problematic objects, Ideas of reason, and exercise of pure practical reason – is 
thereby eliminated: conceptuality and the world as representation are rendered co-extensive, and the 
Kantian faculty of reason is collapsed into the understanding. Schopenhauer supports this 
conclusion by arguing that Kant's central argument for the necessity of differentiating Vernunft 
from Verstand, the Antinomy of Pure Reason, is bogus.20 
 What drove Schopenhauer to this major departure from Kantian doctrine – and indeed to 
focus, in his very first work, on an officially antiquated piece of philosophical apparatus with 
unmistakeable Leibnizian-Wolffian connotations – is his perception of what inevitably happens 
when PSR is allowed to remain in the partially deflated yet fundamentally intact state that Kant 
leaves it in: to wit, the spectacular reinflation which it receives at the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel.21 After Kant had reduced the positive epistemic significance of PSR to (i) the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
which concepts are formed. What concept empiricism adds to the contraction of PSR is the closing 
of a loophole which the transcendent post-Kantian might seek to exploit, viz., the possibility of 
novel conceptual construction. 
20 The theses of all four antinomies are, Schopenhauer argues, groundless: dialectical illusion is 
purely one-sided, and the world infinite in all its dimensions. See MRCD, 480–485; WWR I, 492–
501; and VgP, 492–496. 
21 'Just as though Kant had never existed, the principle of sufficient reason is for Fichte just what it 
was for all the scholastics, namely an aeternae veritas' (WWR I, 33). That Fichte alerted 
Schopenhauer to the importance of PSR is suggested by his annotated lecture notes. In a lecture 
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causality and (ii) the regulative function of reason,22 the German Idealists reinstate the principle 
through their demand for absolute systematic completeness, and embark on the (in Schopenhauer's 
eyes, futile) business of formulating new conceptions of what may count as a Grund, their 
speculative innovations involving transcendent use of Kant's categories.23 
 The German Idealist reinflation and redeployment of PSR, as well as evincing the epistemic 
hubris that Kant sought to curb, has a substantive implication which makes it especially 
objectionable to Schopenhauer. PSR is connected closely in early modern rationalism with the 
ontological argument, which Schopenhauer sees the German Idealist systems as attempting to 
revive: Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre is 'Onto-theology',24 and Schelling 'venerates the ontological 
                                                                                                                                                                                
transcript from 1811 Schopenhauer records Fichte's identification of Wissenschaft with 'the region 
of reasons or grounds', which is 'supernatural or spiritual', and of the Wissenschaftslehre with 'the 
reason or ground of all knowing' (MRCD, 22, 28). In WWR I, 33, Fichte is charged with construing 
the ego-world relation, on the basis of PSR, as a ground-consequent relation.  
22 See Béatrice Longuenesse, 'Kant's Deconstruction of the Principle of Sufficient Reason', in Kant 
on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
23 Again and again Schopenhauer returns to the point that German Idealism rests on a transcendent 
and hence illegitimate employment of a priori concepts, especially that of causality: MRCD, 22, 
359, 372, 376, 378–379, 384–386. In an annotation to lectures from 1811–12, Schopenhauer 
identifies Fichte's fundamental mistake with his 'failure to understand Kant's teaching' ('possibly 
due to a defect in Kant's doctrine') that explanation stops with immanent causes, and describes 
Fichte's appeal to the I qua 'principle' as a concealed attempt to circumvent this restriction (MRCD, 
64; see also 124 and 134). Note that Kant too, on Schopenhauer's account, fell victim to the illusion 
cast by PSR (MRCD, 463n.), and bears some responsibility for the German Idealist development 
(MRCD, 64, 412; FR, 164, 176; VgP, 252–253). 
24 MRCD, 111. 
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proof', of which Hegel's 'whole pseudo-philosophy' is really a 'monstrous amplification'.25 
Schopenhauer views his situation and role in the history of philosophy as reproducing that of Kant: 
just as Kant pitted himself against the Leibnizian-Wolffian school, so Schopenhauer takes up arms 
against German Idealism, aiming to achieve a more decisive outcome by a more direct and far-
reaching attack on PSR.26 
 
2. Schopenhauer's axiological premise 
 
The second ground floor assumption of German Idealism controverted by Schopenhauer, I said, is 
its endorsement of Kant's conception of the source of value, which represents in Schopenhauer's 
eyes yet another abortive attempt to optimize reality. 
 The pessimism that Schopenhauer famously advocates in opposition has, however, a more 
complex structure than his expositions of the doctrine allow readers to suppose, and this complexity 
is a consequence of his treatment of PSR. 
 Schopenhauer's argument often appears to be that the evil of the world derives from the 
negative hedonic balance sheet that necessarily characterizes human (and any other sentient) 
existence.27 However, in so far as its aim is to establish something about the metaphysical quality of 
the world, this argument fails to convince, relying as it does on a phenomenologically strained 
reduction of the objects of desire and valuation to hedonic states: that the satisfaction of every 
desire is followed immediately by the formation a new one does not mean that things are not better 
for its having been satisfied; and in any case there is value, by ordinary lights, simply in being a 
                                                     
25 FR, 16; see also FR, 21–23. 
26 See WWR I, 418, 510–511. 
27 WWR I, §57, and Book IV, passim; PP II, Ch. 12. On this argument, see Christopher Janaway, 
'Schopenhauer's Pessimism', in Christopher Janaway (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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creature that forms and acts on desires, beyond the experiences of satisfaction that doing so may or 
may not procure. Schopenhauer's argument from the predominance of suffering is better viewed, 
however, not as the main point but merely as an auxiliary element in his case for pessimism, which 
has the following form. 
 Ultimately Schopenhauer considers the evil of existence an incontestable given, belonging 
to the physiognomy of the world and not open to debate.28 The problem for Schopenhauer is to 
articulate this insight within the parameters available to him. To be sure, the contraction of PSR 
undermines directly attempts such as Leibniz's to validate the world, and any other account (such as 
those of Schelling and Hegel) which rests on an appeal to final causes. It also cuts off the Kantian 
source of value in human freedom.29 But at the same time, the confinement of PSR to the interior of 
the world as representation appears to remove the basis for any rationally grounded negative 
assessment of the world or its contents considered collectively. Schopenhauer thus seems poised to 
embrace the sheer value-indifference of reality, in the manner of Spinoza, or any contemporary 
naturalist for whom talk of reality's having either positive or negative intrinsic value is nonsensical, 
but doing this would not give him what he wants, which is, to repeat, recognition of the positive 
                                                     
28 As Nietzsche recognizes: 'The ungodliness of existence was for him something given, palpable, 
indisputable ... unconditional and honest atheism is simply the presupposition of the way he poses 
his problem' (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 2nd edn. [1887], trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1974), §357, 307). That it has axiomatic status is shown by the way in which it is 
invoked: see, e.g., MRCD, 391; and WWR II, 577, 581–584, 643. It is the original motor, and a 
condition of, philosophical reflection: see WWR II, 171, 579, and note 40 below. 
29 Directly through its implication of psychological determinism, and indirectly through its 
elimination of Ideas of reason, undermining all of the special devices employed by Kant to conserve 
human freedom in face of the causal principle. 
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reality of evil, as an intrinsic, necessary feature of the world, inseparable from it.30 His task is to 
give sense to this idea. 
 Now Schopenhauer is quite clear that practical consciousness, including the whole domain 
of value, is orthogonal to the world as representation: it is what gives the world as representation its 
ponderousness, its non-illusory quality, but it has no grounds within it; practical and axiological 
significance shines through objects, weighing them down, but reflecting nothing of their mere 
object-being.31 If the evil of the world as representation is to be demonstrated, therefore, it can only 
be by attention to the way in which it manifests what lies beyond it, viz., Wille.32 The crux of 
Schopenhauer's case for pessimism consists accordingly in showing (1) that the world as 
representation derives from a reality which is intrinsically and necessarily without purpose, (2) that 
the world as representation does not merely reflect that underlying reality or reproduce it in 
appearance – which would suffice only for Spinoza's conclusion of value-indifference – but reveals 
itself to be metaphysically defective in relation to it. Book II contains the demonstration of (1). The 
sections of WWR important for (2) are those in which Schopenhauer explains why, once we have 
achieved knowledge of Wille, the world as representation must be perceived as contradictory – an 
incoherent mis-expression in individuated form of a pre-categorial one, which moreover reproduces 
this incoherence within itself, in the form of the conflict of individuated wills with one another and 
                                                     
30 In his very earliest notes, from 1808–09, Schopenhauer describes the world as 'only an image of 
an actual evil existing in eternity ... the (Platonic) Idea of that real, inexplicable and unconditioned 
evil' (MREM, 9). 
31 WWR I, 95 and 98–99. 
32 Note that the mere 'emptiness' or nullity, Nichtigkeit, of the world as representation in the sense of 
its insubstantiality and illusoriness, Scheinbarkeit, consequent upon the purely relational 
constitution of phenomena (WWR I, 7, 366; VgP, 474–477), is not sufficient for pessimism (life's 
dream-likeness does not of itself make life a bad dream or a dream that ought not to be dreamt). 
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within themselves.33 The relevant discussions are those, chiefly in Book IV, of (i) natural teleology 
(concerning the conflictual structure of the organic realm, which exhibits the 'inner antagonism of 
the will'),34 (ii) sexual desire (the subordination of individual will to life to that of the species),35 
(iii) eternal justice (which grasps individuation as a fault or 'sin', to be corrected),36 (iv) egoism and 
ethical conduct (the error of affirming one's individuality, and its overcoming through higher 
knowledge),37 and (v) renunciation, resignation and asceticism (rationally necessary denial of the 
will to live, consequent upon higher knowledge).38 The general character of things in the world, 
Schopenhauer says, is not imperfection but rather 'distortion', reflecting the fact that each thing is 
'something that ought not to be'.39 
 Since the main work in substantiating pessimism has been done as soon as it has been 
established the world ought not to be, the role of the the argument from suffering is limited. What it 
adds, through its reminder that human life does not merit our good opinion on account of its 
hedonic quality, is an uncommonsensical re-interpretation of hedonic experience in light of the 
                                                     
33 This metaphysical contradiction, note, is to be distinguished from the actual contradiction which 
constitutes denial of the will to live (WWR I, 288, 301). The former, which obtains between the two 
worlds or world-aspects, is realized and becomes explicit in the latter, which obtains between the 
phenomenon and itself (as its self-renunciation) or between Wille and the phenomenon (WWR I, 
402–403). 
34 WWR I, 144–149, 161. 
35 WWR II, Chs. 42 and 44, esp. 538–540.  
36 WWR I, 331 and §63; WWR II, 580–582, 604; PP II, 301–302. See also the remarks on tragedy, 
WWR I, 252–255. 
37 WWR I, §61, §§64–66. 
38 WWR I, §68. 
39 PP II, 304. '[I]ndividuality is really only a special error, a false step, something that it would be 
better should not be' (WWR II, 490–491; see also WWR II, 579 and 604). 
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metaphysics of will: Schopenhauer directs us to grasp pleasure and pain not phenomenologically 
but as manifestations of a purposeless dynamic.40 The painfulness and ubiquity of pain are 
therefore, in themselves, not what establishes the truth of pessimism: suffering is probative in the 
case for Schopenhauer's doctrine only on account of what it displays regarding the irrational 
character of reality; his detailed portrait of man's misery provides a posteriori corroboration of the 
metaphysical claim.41 
 I will consider later whether this is cogent. For the present, the point is that Schopenhauer's 
contraction of PSR, and his axiological vision, are interrelated and mutually supporting. If evil has 
positive reality, then this testifies to the limitedness of PSR, and if PSR is limited, then theodical 
strategies for explaining away the manifest evil of the world, and hence denying its positive reality, 
are blocked. Moreover, through the reduction of PSR to a mere relational structure for phenomena, 
                                                     
40 We are to grasp the flow of hedonic experience, its repeated cyclical relapse into some or other 
mode of suffering, as it were formally (rather in the way that we, Schopenhauer supposes, 
apprehend Wille in music). Schopenhauer reformulates the idea interestingly in the assertion 
(directed against Schelling) that I find myself necessarily 'not in an absolute state' but rather in 'a 
state from which I crave release', described as 'the motive of all genuine philosophical endeavour' 
(MRCD, 360, 361, 365). 
41 Just as natural science, according to Schopenhauer's argument in On the Will in Nature, 
corroborates the metaphysics of will. It is to be noted that Schopenhauer has also an axiological 
argument for his pessimistic metaphysics (mirroring Kant's claim that moral interest argues for the 
truth of transcendental idealism): his metaphysics are required – once the contraction of PSR has 
been accepted – in order to preserve the possibility of salvation in the face of our mortality (WWR 
II, 643–644). More broadly, Schopenhauer offers the inducements that – again, given the results of 
Kant's philosophy – no other way of endowing suffering with meaning, or of rescuing any truth in 
Christianity, is available (MREM, 10; MRCD, 338; WWR I, §70; WWR II, Ch. 48). 
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the existence of evil is explained, as supervening on individuation: in Schopenhauer's brilliant 
reversal of Leibniz, PSR is not what saves us from evil but the source of evil itself. 
 
3. Schopenhauer's inversion of Fichte: the blindness of Wille 
 
Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR, and his axiological vision, underpin his inversion of Fichte's 
post-Kantian reconception of the subject as a primarily and essentially volitional conative being. In 
order to become clear about what exactly this comprises, it is necessary to look in some detail at the 
position Fichte develops in his System of Ethics.42 
 Fichte begins, in Cartesian style, with the thinking of oneself. The task is to determine what 
this involves and how it is possible. Fichte argues that originally, at the level of the facts of ordinary 
consciousness, the I must find itself not as thinking, i.e. as intellect, but as willing,43 and that to find 
                                                     
42 This is a clearer and much revised reworking of material in Part Three of the 1794–95 
presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre: J. G. Fichte, Foundations of the Entire Science of 
Knowledge, in The Science of Knowledge, with the First and Second Introductions, ed. and trans. 
Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 256–268. 
Schopenhauer's critical comments on Fichte's System of Ethics are in MRCD, 399–406. It is in this 
text of Fichte's that Johann Friedrich Herbart, in his highly critical review of the first volume of 
WWR ('Rezension, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung von Arthur Schopenhauer. Leipzig, bei F. M. 
Brockhaus. 1819', Hermes, oder, Kritisches Jahrbuch der Literatur 20, 1820, 131–148), claims to 
find already formulated Schopenhauer's thesis that will comprises the inner essence of the subject. 
43 For the reason that thinking requires something objective set in opposition to it, if it is to become 
an object, whereas willing, at the level of facts of consciousness, stands necessarily in opposition to 
something objective: J. G. Fichte, The System of Ethics according to the Principles of the 
Wissenschaftslehre [1798], ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 26. 
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oneself more specifically as a willing from which all that is foreign has been abstracted, as the task 
at hand requires, is to find oneself as a tendency (Tendenz), or faculty or power (Vermögen), 
towards self-activity. Alternatively put: I find myself as a tendency to determine myself absolutely, 
without any external impetus, or again, as a tendency to self-activity for self-activity's sake.44 
 And since, in thus finding oneself, one finds oneself as (identical with) that which is found, 
and since, equally, that which does the finding brings what it finds under the sway of concepts, the I 
in finding itself as a Tendenz grasps itself also as an intellect. Consciousness of self, as having both 
power and freedom, arises therewith: the I grasps itself as capable of giving itself determinations 
through concepts.45 The problem which now arises, according to Fichte, is that the conception 
which has been provided so far remains that of a mere power without actuality.46 Alternatively 
stated, the problem is that we have got only as far as an intellect that intuits itself as pure activity, 
standing in opposition to all subsisting and being posited.47 The solution, Fichte argues, is for the 
Tendenz to be thought to assume a more robust form, which he calls drive, Trieb, defined as 'a real, 
inner explanatory ground of an actual self-activity – a drive, moreover, that is posited as essential, 
subsisting, and ineradicable'.48 Fichte draws an analogy with the elasticity in a compressed steel 
spring as an inner ground of its activity. 
                                                     
44 That there is a 'sake' or aim – separating Fichte from Schopenhauer at the outset – is crucial. 
Schelling, in his still Fichtean System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1978), p. 35, considers and rejects the possibility that the 
self's activity is fundamentally 'blind'. 
45 And only through concepts, Fichte, System of Ethics, p. 42. 
46 The I's finding itself as a Tendenz has not, we now see, been sufficiently accounted for; Fichte, 
System of Ethics, pp. 43–44. 
47 See Fichte, System of Ethics, p. 42. 
48 Fichte, System of Ethics, p. 44. 
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 With this last shift, we are clearly approaching Schopenhauer's conceptual neighbourhood. 
What should be emphasized for present purposes, however, are the features of this notion of drive 
which lock it into Fichte's project. As we have seen, it is introduced by Fichte in the context of a 
transcendental enquiry into the possibility of self-consciousness. The problem set by self-
consciousness can also be viewed, Fichte explains, in terms of the demand that we, in philosophical 
reflection, construct a concept, which we are to suppose available to the I itself, of the identity of 
subject and object. Now this demand, Fichte affirms, cannot be met: one cannot think of oneself as 
that identity, since thinking introduces the very distinction that the identity is to exclude. The 
concept remains, consequently, 'a problem or task for thinking', an 'empty place' which we 
designate with an X.49 The drive to absolute self-activity which constitutes the being of the I is, it 
follows, a drive which aims at the I in its entirety, the unthinkable identity of subject and object. 
 Fichte's drive is, therefore, necessarily engaged with the space of reasons, inseparable from 
conceptuality, and constituted by a telos. It will come as no surprise to learn that it enjoys also a 
necessary connection with morality. The drive to self-activity, Fichte argues, manifests itself in and 
as a thought, which Fichte identifies with the categorical imperative, in the form of the principle of 
autonomy.50 Because the I in its entirety, the X of subject-object identity, cannot be grasped, the 
drive to self-activity must take the form of an approximation to it, consisting in 'a reciprocal 
determination of what is subjective by what is objective and vice versa'; and to proceed with this 
reciprocal determination, Fichte argues, is to act under the (self-given) law of self-sufficiency, 
which excludes determination of the I by the Not-I. 
 It is a consequence of this transcendental theory that Fichte can claim to have reconstructed 
Kant's thesis of the equivalence of freedom and the moral law,51 and also to have effected a 
                                                     
49 Fichte, System of Ethics, pp. 45–46. 
50 Fichte, System of Ethics, pp. 48–63. 
51 Fichte, System of Ethics, pp. 55–56. 
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unification, not furnished by Kant, of practical and theoretical reason, finally putting beyond doubt 
the capacity of reason to be practical.52 
 Thus far, drive has been understood without any reference to the subject's phenomenology, 
but it is a general methodological requirement of the Wissenschaftslehre that its model be shown to 
accord with the facts of ordinary consciousness. Fichte adds accordingly an account of how, and in 
what form, drive shows up in ordinary consciousness, namely as a feeling of drive, called 'longing' 
(Sehnen): an 'indeterminate sensation of a need' which is 'not determined through the concept of an 
object'.53 The feeling of drive is therefore the final manifestation of an underlying structure which 
has the character of a quintessentially rational task (Aufgabe), postulate (Postulat), or 'ought' 
(Sollen). 
 If we now return to Schopenhauer, we can see immediately the various respects in which he, 
while endorsing Fichte's insight that the metaphysical core of the subject consists in drive, turns 
Fichte's theory on its head.54 What Fichte takes as merely the most superficial manifestation of 
rational end-directed conation, the feeling of drive, is treated by Schopenhauer as primary, and as a 
sufficient basis for metaphysical extrapolation.55 Schopenhauer furthermore takes volitional feeling 
in isolation from representational consciousness, whereas it belongs to the central thrust of Fichte's 
argument that will and representation are reciprocally determining.56 On the basis of this isolated 
                                                     
52 Fichte, System of Ethics, p. 56, pp. 59–60. 
53 Fichte, System of Ethics, pp. 101–103. Fichte denies that willing can be identified with, or that it 
originally manifests itself as, feeling (pp. 46–48 and p. 85), but nonetheless presents the connection 
as necessary. 
54 See Schopenhauer's criticism of Fichte's theory of willing in MRCD, 406–408, 413–414; willing, 
Schopenhauer counters, 'cannot be defined'. 
55 See WWR I, 109–110. 
56 Fichte, System of Ethics, pp. 81–87; in addition to the objects on which I act, my willing itself 
must be represented.  
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datum, Schopenhauer infers the essentially non-teleological and non-conceptual character of Wille. 
Given Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR, the inference is indisputably valid: there is indeed 
nothing in the bare phenomenal feeling of drive or will which invites, or could possibly warrant, the 
complex and abstract structure which Fichte takes it to manifest; Fichte's interpretation of the facts 
of consciousness can get a purchase only because he assumes, as PSR entitles him to do, that there 
must be a reason for the existence of feeling, both in general and in this instance, as a type of 
mental state.57 Fichte's claim that 'the I itself has to be considered as the absolute ground of its 
drive', and that 'this drive appears as a freely designed concept of an end',58 is thus inverted: 
Schopenhauer treats drive, impersonally conceived and directed to no end, as the ground of the I.59 
                                                     
57 Thus Fichte analyzes feeling as 'sheer determination', 'a mere determinacy of the intellect, without 
any contribution on the part of the intellect's freedom', System of Ethics, p. 102. Compare 
Schopenhauer's brief definition of feeling in WWR I, 51. Karl Fortlage, in his 1845 review of the 
second volume of WWR (extracted in Volker Spierling (ed.), Materialen zu Schopenhauers »Die 
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung« (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), pp. 119–126), defends 
Fichte: Schopenhauer's concept of will without intelligence is, he argues, incoherent; in systematic 
terms, Schopenhauer represents merely an intermediation in the transition from Kant to Fichte (and 
Schelling). 
58 Fichte, System of Ethics, p. 103. 
59 Even if Schopenhauer's non-Fichtean concept of will owes something to the Urwille posited in 
Schelling's Freiheitsschrift as primal being, Ursein – Philosophical Investigations into the Essence 
of Human Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith [1809], trans. Jeff Love and Johannes 
Schmidt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), 350, p. 21 – Schelling does not 
invert Fichte's conception in the manner of Schopenhauer: the Urwille is without understanding yet 
not independent of it, because it is a yearning or desire for it, and is prescient, ahndend, of it; 'the 
understanding is really the will in will', and it joins with yearning to form God's omnipotent and 
freely creative will. Schopenhauer's low estimate of Schelling's essay, as a bad reworking of Jakob 
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Released from individuation, purposeless drive is ready to assume the role of substrate of the 
objectual world as such. 
 
4. Schopenhauer and the meta-Critical problem 
 
The flat disagreement between Fichte and Schopenhauer concerning the nature of drive or will goes 
back to their philosophical starting points and widely divergent views of the problems that need to 
be solved. We see here what a large part is played in generating Schopenhauer's metaphysical 
conclusions by his prior refusal of the German Idealist agenda. In taking transcendental subjectivity 
as an unconditional basic element in his analysis of representation in Book I of WWR, and in 
asserting that it stands in a relation of bare Korrelation with objects,60 Schopenhauer rejects 
implicitly the Kantian idea, which Fichte preserves, that the subject's object-consciousness must be 
treated as an explanandum. Schopenhauer's discarding of Kant's theory of synthesis is closely 
connected with this rejection: on Schopenhauer's account, the subject is necessary for objects qua 
their correlate, but it is not involved in constituting the unity fundamental to objecthood in the way 
that Kant hypothesizes, just as the subject's unity of consciousness receives for Schopenhauer no 
explanation of its possibility by reference to the unity of objects. Again, when in Book II 
Schopenhauer raises the question of how the subject of representation comes to cognize itself as an 
individuated content of the objective world,61 the question is understood – this we can infer from 
the way in which it is answered – as precisely not involving a solution to the problem of self-
                                                                                                                                                                                
Böhme, is in MRCD, 353–354, and FR, 22–23, and it is dismissed once again in PP I, 26. The 
substantial criticism made by Schopenhauer, reasserting once again the contraction of PSR, is that 
Schelling interpolates the ground-consequent relation within God (FR, 22). In PP I, 132, 
Schopenhauer denies Schelling's influence. 
60 See WWR I, §5. 
61 WWR I, 99 and 103. 
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consciousness as Kant and Fichte understand it: Schopenhauer simply lays it down that the subject 
of thought is able to grasp itself as one and the same in representing and willing, in other words, 
that the bare phenomenal having-of-feeling involved in volitional episodes suffices for a grasp of 
myself as willing.62 The question with which Fichte labours, concerning the very possibility of the 
I's attributing efficacy to itself, is nowhere raised.63 
 All in all, then, a range of transcendental questions formulated and addressed in the 
Transcendental Deduction and elsewhere in Kant, taken by Fichte and the later German Idealists to 
frame the task of post-Kantian philosophy, are set aside by Schopenhauer, whose form of post-
Kantian idealism is to that extent appropriately described as, in the strict sense, non-
transcendental.64 Whether this implies a reversion to 'dogmatism' or otherwise constitutes a 
                                                     
62 In response to Fichte, Schopenhauer asserts that the I 'is merely intuitively perceivable': 'an I is 
something found merely as a fact, something simply given' (MRCD, 73). Schopenhauer's refusal to 
accept that there is a problem concerning how the I can become an object for itself is explicit in 
comments on Schelling, MRCD, 381 and 383. 
63 To be fully clear, the transcendental question is not raised; what is raised is a question concerning 
the inter-relations of facts of consciousness, which Schopenhauer answers by reference to bodily 
awareness. The body cannot provide an answer to the transcendental question, since, even if 
awareness of embodiment provides an explanation of how volitional as opposed to representational 
consciousness is possible, as Schopenhauer asserts (WWR I, 100–101), the identification of oneself 
with one's body is presupposed and not accounted for. It is also noteworthy – as another aspect of 
the inversion that I have been pointing to – that Schopenhauer's assumption that the body explains 
volitional awareness reverses the order in Fichte, who derives the physical power of efficacy from 
the practical principle governing the I and the necessity of determining one's freedom: see Fichte, 
System of Ethics, pp. 71–91. 
64 See MRCD, 466–472, where Schopenhauer repudiates the task of transcendental logic, viewing it 
as rendered redundant by the appreciation that the understanding is a faculty of intuitive perception. 
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weakness is a separate matter, about which something will be said in the next section. For the 
present, it may simply be noted that a clear rationale for Schopenhauer's divergence from Kant and 
his rival post-Kantians can be located, once again, in his axiological commitments, in so far as the 
transcendentalist ambition of excogitating transparent foundations for knowledge and value implies 
a determination to discover the world to be rational through and through. 
 Support for this non-transcendentalist construal can be found in Schopenhauer's early 
notebooks, in which he works through major positions occupied in the early post-Kantian 
development. Included here are Schulze's skepticism, J. F. Fries' and Jacobi's Glaubensphilosophie, 
Fichte's subjective absolute idealism, Schelling's Naturphilosophie and Real-Idealismus and all of 
the other innovations contained in Schelling's writings up to and including the Freiheitsschrift. 
Schopenhauer had therefore a wide range of post-Kantian options at his disposal.65 What is striking 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Schopenhauer's rejection of transcendental argumentation is explored in Paul Guyer, 
'Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Method of Philosophy', in Christopher Janaway (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Schopenhauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See however Rudolf 
Malter's transcendental reconstruction of Schopenhauer, 'Schopenhauers Transzendentalismus', 
Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 66, 1985, 29–51, and Günter Zöller's comments in 'Schopenhauer and the 
Problem of Metaphysics: Critical Reflections on Rudolf Malter's Interpretation', Man and World 28, 
1995, 1–10. 
65 The list is not complete. Reinhold is absent, and does not figure in Schopenhauer's published 
works, even though his own approach has similarity with Reinhold's conception of analysis the facts 
of consciousness. Fichte criticized this conception and to some degree, in rejecting Fichte, 
Schopenhauer is returning to Reinhold's plainer view of Critical method. Hegel is also missing from 
Schopenhauer's early notebooks. In later writings Schopenhauer focusses on the metaphysical 
results of Hegel's Logic, which he regards as a variant of Schelling's position (PP II, 27–28); 
nowhere (to the best of my knowledge) is the method of the Phenomenology discussed in any detail 
by Schopenhauer. 
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in the early notebooks, however, is the absence of any sustained constructive engagement with the 
meta-Critical issues thrown up by Kantian philosophy. Schopenhauer records his dissatisfaction 
with all of the positions on offer, availing himself of their mutual criticisms, but proposes no answer 
of his own to the question of how propositions about non-empirical matters can be known and their 
truth ascertained. Nor, as I indicated earlier in emphasizing Schopenhauer's non-transcendentalism, 
is this deficiency remedied in WWR. Arguably, the best construal of Schopenhauer's position on 
meta-Critical issues is as a kind of semi-skeptical return to naivety: Schopenhauer appears to 
suppose that, since none of the ambitious and innovative post-Kantian developments yield an 
improved account of Kant's position, the Critical method is best regarded as a practice of simply 
reading off metaphysical truths directly from the facts of consciousness.66 The Kantian task of 
proving transcendental propositions is eliminated, and the vital Kantian question of whether what 
we are necessitated to think corresponds to how things themselves must be, is overtaken by the 
metaphysical assertion of two worlds, one constructed within representation and the other 
unrepresentable. 
 
5. The architecture of Schopenhauer's system 
 
There is another respect, connected with the foregoing, in which Schopenhauer's project contrasts 
with that of the German Idealists. As we have seen, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre has as one of its 
principal aims the exposure of a common root of Freedom and Nature, and of the practical and 
                                                     
66 They are 'seen and grasped a priori'; a priori laws are simply 'given to the understanding' 
(MRCD, 335–336). The post-Kantian to whom Schopenhauer here comes closest is Fries. In 
comments on Aristotle Schopenhauer asserts that 'there is no knowledge of knowledge' (MRCD, 
454). Note the extremely minimal definition of transcendental philosophy at PP II, 9, as starting 
from consciousness rather than things; the fuller account at PP I, 82–84, identifies it merely with 
the thesis of the a priori origin ('rooted in our brain') of the essential laws of the world. 
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theoretical. The German Idealists' project of unification – their aim, taking its cue from the third 
Critique (as they understood it) yet going beyond it, to comprehend Kant's dualities in a single 
system in such a way as to exhibit their common source as an essential unity – is not shared by 
Schopenhauer.67 Schopenhauer does not, however, merely reaffirm the necessity of an incompletely 
unified, multi-component system of philosophy of the sort that Kant considers the most that human 
reason can achieve. His relation to the post-Kantian unificatory project is more complex. 
 Schopenhauer's distance from the project of unification arises in part from his avoidance of 
one of the key Kantian dualities: since Schopenhauer denies the existence of practical reason in the 
sense maintained by Kant,68 the doctrine of the primacy of pure practical reason – with all of the 
complications that it creates concerning the respective rights and interests, and the necessary 
strategies of integration, of practical and theoretical reason; issues of huge importance to Fichte and 
the early Schelling – does not figure at all for Schopenhauer, who instead straightforwardly 
identifies philosophy as such with theoretical philosophy, in Kant's sense.69 
 Within this context, however, Schopenhauer reasserts Kant's practical/theoretical duality in 
the form of the distinction of the world as Wille, which gives it, as noted, all of its practical 
significance, and the world as representation, which exists for the necessarily disinterested subject 
                                                     
67 The 'main tendency of the Kantian philosophy' is instead 'to demonstrate the complete diversity of 
the real and the ideal' (PP I, 86; see also 25). 
68 See MRCD, 337–338; WWR I, 522–523; VgP, 418–420. For a concise statement of his anti-
Kantian, broadly Humean view, see MRCD, 351. 
69 WWR I, 271, 285. Schopenhauer conserves Kant's idea of the special connection of ethical 
conduct with metaphysical truth (e.g. WWR I, 384; WWR II, 600), but without Kant's cognitive 
privileging of the 'practical point of view'. Ethical action is for Schopenhauer an enacting or acting 
out, a symbolization within the world as representation, of the reality of Wille, cognition of which is 
theoretical. 
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of knowing.70 Kant's practical/theoretical distinction is conserved, therefore, through its outright 
identification with another core Kantian duality, that of appearances and things in themselves. This 
has a major implication, which refers us back to Schopenhauer's rejection of Kantian practical 
reason and inversion of Fichte's account of the will: if practical consciousness is analyzed in terms 
of Wille, then Ought is reducible to Is; contrary to Fichte's view of the absolute primacy of the 
Sollen, there can be nothing more to oughtness than awareness (in one mode or another) of the 
being of Wille.71 By virtue of its dualist architecture, then, Schopenhauer's system stays closer to 
Kant than do the German Idealists, but in so far as Schopenhauer resolves all dualities into the 
single one of Wille and Vorstellung, Schopenhauer follows at least part of the way the unificatory 
vector of German Idealism. 
 There is a further respect in which Schopenhauer takes the side of German Idealism against 
Kant. Kant's reservations concerning the possibility of systematic completeness are grounded on his 
thesis of the inherent limitations of human reason. Schopenhauer's anti-monism, by contrast, is 
untethered from the idea of epistemic limitation. The distinction of Wille and representation is 
absolute in a sense not admissible for Kant: it represents a denial not just of the possibility of our 
forging a philosophical system with the strong unity sought by the German Idealists, but of the 
metaphysical possibility that Wille and the world as representation form a real unity. So, whereas 
Kant leaves it open, and necessarily thinkable, that the dualities within human reason are united at 
some point which transcends our cognitive powers – indeed the third Critique teaches that beauty 
and natural teleology at least point to (if no more) a unitary ground of the sensible and supersensible 
– Schopenhauer's position is that the several roads of philosophical reflection which we must go 
                                                     
70 WWR II, 499. 
71 Schopenhauer celebrates Kant's notion of 'a point of view where the moral law appears not as an 
ought (Sollen) but as a being (Sein)' (MRCD, 326–327). See the criticism of the imperatival form of 
Kantian ethics in §4 of BM, 136–143. The shift of idiom, from Sollen to Sein, is pursued in 
Schopenhauer's account of human freedom, in terms of intelligible character: see FW. 
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down in our endeavour to solve the riddle of existence do not join up at any point.72 Again this is a 
direct implication of his contraction of PSR. 
 The next question to be considered is whether Schopenhauer succeeds in charting a clear 
course between Kant and Fichte-Schelling. 
 
II.  Schopenhauer's difficulties  
 
1. Wille as ground of the world as representation 
 
Schopenhauer denies that that the relation of the will or thing in itself to the phenomenon is a 
relation of causality.73 This follows from Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR. But Schopenhauer 
does not allow the realm of the thinkable to coincide with the boundaries of the world as 
representation, nor does he confine explanation to relations between worldly objects, for the world 
itself 'is to be explained solely from the will whose objectivity it is, and not through causality'.74 
 The problem is straightforward. So long as some element of explanation is involved in 
referring the phenomenal world to Wille – and Schopenhauer speaks readily of metaphysical 
                                                     
72 In a comment on Schelling, Schopenhauer complains of his forcing a false unity on the human 
subject, 'as a bridge to unite the two worlds': the genuine, critical philosopher by contrast is 'content 
to have ... recognized the twofold nature of his being', which 'appears to him as two parallel lines 
which he does not bend or twist in order to unite' (MRCD, 376–377). If they meet, it is in a sphere 
accessible only to the mystic. True philosophy, 'instead of uniting the two heterogeneous worlds 
into monstra ... will always try to separate them more completely' (MRCD, 412). 
73 E.g. MRCD, 489, WWR I, 120, 140, 502–507. 
74 MRCD, 489; see also WWR I, 507. 
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Erklärung75 – some employment of the categories of ground and consequent, as Kant would put it, 
must be present. The explanation may be non-causal, but it must nonetheless incorporate a 'because' 
relation. Without it, we are simply left with (at most) sub-propositional, non-conceptual awareness 
of the world as awash with a certain all-pervasive mental quality, the quality possessed by acts of 
will; and although this might provide the cue for some such metaphorical thought as that the world 
'insists itself' or 'exerts pressure', obviously it will not provide Schopenhauer with a sufficient basis 
for any of the determinate discursive conclusions that he wants to extract from his grounding of 
phenomena on Wille.76 
                                                     
75 E.g. PP II, 91; contrary to his own explicit claim, in WWR I, 80, that Erklärung is the 
establishment of 'the relation of the phenomena of the world to one another according to the 
principle of sufficient reason'. 
76 I do not know of any passage where Schopenhauer addresses this issue, and it may be asked why 
he does not do so. At one place Schopenhauer appears to address the similar though even more 
basic problem of how it is possible for us to think (form a concept of) will at all, given its 
heterogeneity with representation and non-conformity to PSR: '[T]he concept of will is of all 
possible concepts the only one that has its origin not in the phenomenon, not in the mere 
representation of perception, but which comes from within, and proceeds from the most immediate 
consciousness of everyone' (WWR I, 112). If Schopenhauer can be allowed this on the basis of his 
concept empiricism, then we can conceptualize features of or phenomena in the world not tied to 
PSR. But what still cannot be accounted for is the relation between Wille and Vorstellung required 
by his metaphysical 'because' claim: there can be no 'immediate experience' of because-ness (or, if 
there can, then we have intellectual intuition after all). My conjecture is that Schopenhauer supposes 
implicitly that the 'because' relation, or all that he needs it to amount to, is given immediately in the 
experience of bodily willing. The relation of (i) my (subjective experience of my) willing my arm to 
rise, and (ii) the objective event (in the world as representation) of my arm's rising, is declared to be 
a relation not of causation but identity (WWR I, §18). Schopenhauer may suppose that this intuition 
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 Viewed from another angle, the problem lies in Schopenhauer's taking it for granted that the 
objectual world as such can pose a 'riddle' at all. In order to even form the thought of the world as 
constituting an explanandum which demands a metaphysical explanans – i.e., as not simply 
explicable, and adequately explained, in so far as its contents are interrelated in accordance with 
PSR – it is necessary to suspend Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR.77 
 The problem shows itself also in Schopenhauer's axiology. Schopenhauer's pessimism rests, 
I suggested, on the perception of a metaphysical dissonance, for which it is essential that the world 
of representation be ontologically subordinated to, and measured in terms set by, the world as Wille; 
this is what allows Schopenhauer to strike down, as normative illusions, the ends that human beings 
set themselves. But it may be wondered if this strategy succeeds. The mere judgement that one layer 
of reality is dependent on another may be necessary, but is it sufficient, for the negative assessment 
of the world as representation, its condemnation as ontologically defective? There is no obvious 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of the will/body nexus – our immediate grasp of it as identity-like yet asymmetric, with body 
depending on will and not vice versa – provides what is needed for his metaphysical extrapolation. 
This construal of his thinking gets support from his emphatic claim that we discover in self-
consciousness a meeting point of subject and object, and of phenomenon and Wille (WWR I, 102; 
WWR II, 497). But again – even granting this 'miracle par excellence' – this does not solve the 
problem of how we come to think this intuited ontological fact in the way Schopenhauer requires, 
namely as a quasi-causal quasi-identity. For this reason, Schopenhauer can get no mileage out of 
pressing a distinction between 'the subject of knowing' and the 'subject of representation': even if 
non-representational cognition is possible, its content must still be thought; else it is mystical (and 
Schopenhauer denies that his metaphysics are 'illuminist': PP II, 10). 
77 At WWR II, 640, Schopenhauer comes close to conceding that the further metaphysical questions 
which, he allows, his system does not answer, 'cannot be thought by means of the forms and 
functions of the intellect'. The question is why this is not true also of the metaphysical questions 
which, he maintains, his system does answer. 
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logical principle compelling us to take the stronger view, and there are grounds for thinking that in 
arriving at this verdict Schopenhauer relies on elements he is not entitled to. At key junctures 
Schopenhauer appeals to what he calls our 'better consciousness',78 but in so far as its superiority is 
merely asserted, it is open to the Kantian, or German Idealist, to object that Schopenhauer faces a 
hard choice: either the superiority of the standpoint that he recommends, from which we condemn 
the world as a cosmic mistake, is merely stipulated (or, as the Nietzschean may suggest, a matter of 
motivated taste); or it has normative foundations, in which case Schopenhauer has betrayed his own 
contraction of PSR to the world as representation, and his 'better consciousness' is playing the role 
of affording a higher level of reflection which Vernunft plays in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. To 
put the point another way: the problem is that we are required to understand the 'expression' of Wille 
in the world of representation in a normative sense, since we are to judge that the latter is a mis-
expression of the former; but a normative understanding of the concept is inadmissible given the 
contraction of PSR. 
 
2. Schopenhauer's two models 
 
The foregoing points to a tension in Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Two ideas essential to 
Schopenhauer's position are, first, that there is no properly intelligible relation between Wille and 
the world as representation, and second, that the latter must be regarded as a higher species of 
illusion, as the 'veil of Maya'.79 What this naturally suggests is that the expression of Wille in the 
world as representation consists in its objectification, Objektivation, in the sense of the subject's 
making an object of cognition, a Vorstellung, out of Wille. Though cognitively nothing is achieved 
                                                     
78 MREM, 23, 46, 72; MRCD, 19, 373, 374, 376, 416, 430, 431. It is exhibited in virtuous conduct, 
and associated with genius. Plausibly Schopenhauer's notion of better consciousness owes 
something to Fries' conception of Ahnung. 
79 WWR I, 8, 17, 523. 
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thereby, since the PSR-defined formal structure of cognition falsifies Wille, the character of Wille as 
purposeless striving shows up in the concrete, non-formal features of the world as representation. 
 Here the relation of Wille to representation is grasped from the angle of the subject. This 
model, which we might call epistemic or perhaps 'Eastern', tallies of course with Schopenhauer's 
claim to be upholding Kant's insight into the ideality of empirical objects, and arguably provides a 
ground for pessimism, in so far as its derealization of the world as representation strips the objects 
of human valuation of genuine reality. It also agrees with the conception of ethics as founded on 
compassion,80 and it helpfully allows Schopenhauer to dismiss, as reflecting a misunderstanding of 
his position, the question of the nature of the overarching unity of the world(s) of Wille and 
representation.81 If the sphere of Vorstellung is an illusion, so too is its correlate, the transcendental 
subject, the 'existence' of which, along with the world of objects, can be attributed to epistemic error 
and held to be dissolved through its correction. 
 This model is however by no means consistent with everything in Schopenhauer's picture. It 
is doubtful in the first place that it fits with the reading of expression demanded by the idea that 
Wille constitutes the inner Kern of the subject and other individuated entities,82 a conception 
underlined in Schopenhauer's philosophy of natural science, which demands metaphysical grounds 
                                                     
80 To amplify: it allows the apparently inchoate thought entertained by the virtuous agent – viz., that 
I should act benevolently because I am the suffering other and do not exist as 'I' (see BM, 211–213) 
– to be validated as tracking the incoherent shape of reality as presented to a subject who has 
grasped that the world as representation is mere illusion. 
81 As it does the notion, which Schopenhauer allows to suggest itself, and which we will see is 
developed by Hartmann, that Wille gives birth to transcendental subjectivity in order to restore 
itself to tranquillity, and so is not blind after all. 
82 In statements such as: 'The will appears in everything, precisely as it determines itself in itself ... 
all finiteness, all sufferings ... belong to the expression of what the will wills, are as they are 
because the will so wills' (WWR I, 351). 
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for natural phenomena.83 In particular, the epistemic model does not cohere with the claim that 
Wille finally achieves cognition of itself. Some of Schopenhauer's statements suggest that attributing 
self-knowledge to Wille just means that one of its individuated products has self-knowledge (or 
perhaps: knows itself to be an individuated product of Wille), but the full story of denial of the will 
does require that Wille itself, not merely its individual human objectifications, achieve genuine 
cognitive (and, thereby, practical) reflexivity.84 The epistemic model thereupon gives way to a 
metaphysical (or 'Western') conception, familiar from Schelling, according to which reality 
undergoes a real transformation in so far as it assumes a new form in human subjectivity.85 The 
expression of Wille in the world as representation now amounts to Objektivation in the quite 
different sense of Wille's making itself into an object, by giving itself determinate form,86 and its 
being an object of cognition, an object for a subject, becomes secondary, a supervening 
consequence of the self-expressive activity of Wille. Here the relation of Wille to representation is 
grasped from the angle of Wille. 
 This shift of conception rationalizes the doctrine of denial of will, but it creates difficulties 
for all of the elements that the epistemic model makes sense of. In particular it interferes with the 
argument for pessimism. If Wille in fact becomes the world as representation, then there is scope for 
                                                     
83 See WWR I, §27; WWR II, Ch. 26; PP II, Ch. 6; and WN. Also relevant is Schopenhauer's 
endorsement of occasionalism, WWR I, 138. 
84 This is required if Wille is to, as Schopenhauer says, 'freely abolish itself' by 'relating such 
knowledge to itself' (WWR I, 285, 288). It is also implied by the notion that, in the individual's 
denial of the will to live, the freedom which Wille alone can possess is manifest, 'immediately 
visible', in the phenomenon (WWR I, 402; see also 403 and 404). 
85 See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. 
86 Thus Schopenhauer talks of Wille, reflexively, as 'objectifying itself' (sich objektivirenden 
Willens), 'entering the form of representation' (in die Form der Vorstellung eingegangen ist) and 
thereby 'becoming knowable' (WWR I, 115, 120, 506). 
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deeming the latter a transcendence of the former, a newly created, higher reality which sets its own 
terms of evaluation: if Wille has ceased to be blind and acquired a real teleology, then the ends 
projected by sentient beings cannot be cancelled as metaphysical errors.87 
 Thus, although the two versions of Objektivation – epistemic objectification by the subject, 
and Wille's metaphysical self-determination – are not inconsistent, and might be taken as 
complementary views of the same event, which is perhaps how Schopenhauer wishes to think of 
them, the two models have, as we have seen, contradictory implications for key theses in 
Schopenhauer's philosophy. That Schopenhauer may indeed have granted both models a place in his 
metaphysics, invoking them in different contexts without appreciating their incompatibility, is 
rendered likely by his assertion of a grounding relation between Wille and representation not 
governed by PSR: in so far as the relation is indeed in reality one of ground and consequent, the 
metaphysical model is implied; in so far as it eludes PSR, it can consist only in epistemic error. 
 
3. Between Kant and German Idealism 
 
In addition to the doubling of Eastern/epistemic and Western/metaphysical models, a separate 
tension can also be identified in Schopenhauer, occurring at a more fundamental, metaphilosophical 
level, and which is consequent upon the complex movement of his philosophy away from German 
Idealism and back to Kant, and then again forward from Kant to reoccupy the territory of German 
Idealism. I claimed earlier that Schopenhauer asserts an absolute distinction of will and 
                                                     
87 The Western model does not therefore cohere with the abolition of Wille itself (in addition to the 
world as representation), which Schopenhauer seems to say follows from denial of the will to live 
(WWR I, 410–411). This claim appears to demand both models: in order for quieting of Wille, as 
opposed to mere dissolution of illusion, to ensue from the denial, it is necessary that Wille be 
genuinely present in the phenomenon; but if it is so present, then Wille has genuinely become a 
sphere of individuated objective entities, and it is unclear how it can retract its self-transformation. 
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representation, entailing the impossibility of a real unity of Wille and the world as representation. 
Such a claim, not hedged by any Kantian epistemic qualification to the effect that dualism is simply 
the best that our cognitive powers can manage, is what Schopenhauer needs in order to counter 
German Idealism's monism at its own level. But such absolute dualism, as it may be called, sits ill 
with Schopenhauer's avowed commitment to immanence and the standpoint of ordinary empirical 
consciousness.88 
 It is consequently fair to describe Schopenhauer as seeking to negotiate a way between two 
opposed positions:89 on the one hand, Kant's view that only perspectival conclusions, judgements 
about the nature of things relativized to our cognitive capacities and having only the status of 
necessities of representation, are licensed; and on the other, the non-perspectival absolutism of the 
German Idealists, which rejects Kant's separation of mere necessities of representation from the true 
necessities governing things as they really are.90 Schopenhauer internalizes both approaches to 
metaphysics, and seeks to combine them in a novel way. The product is a conception of two worlds, 
which are not so much ontologically unequal in virtue of their possessing a different degree of 
reality according to a single measure, as ontologically heterogeneous in so far as each is associated 
with and defined by a different conception of what being consists in: in the case of Wille, being is 
conceived as intrinsically antithetical to cognition, and in that of Vorstellung, it is identified with 
it.91 Though we must treat the two conceptions as bearing on the same world, their heterogeneity 
entails that the relation between them cannot be grasped.92 This feature is present also, to some 
                                                     
88 WWR I, 272–273; WWR II, 640; PP II, 6–9. 
89 Reflected in his (semi-paradoxical) statement that philosophy is 'conditioned knowledge of the 
absolute' (MRCD, 358–359). 
90 Schopenhauer lays claim to 'absolute truth' ('in so far as such a truth is in general attainable'), 
WWR II, 472; will is 'that which is absolutely real in every being', PP II, 95. 
91 '[T]he word being means ''being known through the senses and the understanding''' (MRCD, 421). 
92 WWR II, 497, 'the two heterogeneous sides of the world ... are absolutely incommensurable'. 
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degree, in Kant's account – in so far as Kant denies that the relation of appearances and things in 
themselves is open to theoretical cognition – but it becomes problematic in Schopenhauer in a way 
that it is not in Kant, in virtue of the fact that, as we have seen, Schopenhauer eliminates the basis 
supplied by Kant for the co-thinkability of the two worlds, namely the categories. 
 Schopenhauer's accommodation of mysticism fits into this picture in the following way.93 In 
so far as Schopenhauer counters German Idealism's monism with an absolute dualism, 
Schopenhauer appears exposed to charges of incompleteness: a whole range of questions is, he 
acknowledges frankly, left unanswered.94 Mysticism provides a solution: Kant's modest, 
epistemically qualified, perspectival conception of philosophical knowledge is re-invoked at the 
outer limit of Schopenhauer's system as a ground for legitimating mystical claims, allowing 
Schopenhauer to acknowledge his system's explanatory limitations while reaffirming its 
philosophical completeness. 
 One final observation may be made, concerning the way Schopenhauer recasts Kant's 
distinction of appearances and things in themselves. As noted previously, Schopenhauer's 
contracted PSR differs from Kant's principles of experience in not owing its truth to any 
normatively defined epistemic function (of 'making experience possible') that it performs for us. 
The knowledge we have of PSR is instead of a kind that, in Kant's terms, belongs (like the claims of 
the German Idealists) to dogmatic metaphysics: it specifies the entire intrinsic constitution of a type 
of object (albeit a very special type, which includes cognition within its constitution). Our 
knowledge of the sphere defined by PSR is thus not mere perspectival knowledge, in the way that 
for Kant knowledge of appearance counts as a mere perspective on something (unknown) that is not 
itself appearance. Furthermore, although knowledge of the world as representation is not knowledge 
of a substance – since it does not contain the condition of its own existence – its (unique and 
                                                     
93 WWR I, 410; WWR II, 610–614. 
94 As he acknowledges: WWR II, 640–641. WWR II, 579: 'even the most perfect philosophy will 
always contain an unexplained element, like an insoluble precipitate or remainder'. 
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sufficient) ontological requisite, viz. Wille, is known to us. We know, therefore, both the essence 
and the ground of the world as representation. Now, just as Schopenhauerian Vorstellung is not 
Kantian Erscheinung, so Schopenhauer's thing in itself is not Kant's, and in Kant's terms, 
Schopenhauer's claims to knowledge of the world as representation – viz., as constituted internally 
by PSR and grounded externally on Wille – is already knowledge of a thing in itself: though 
Schopenhauer's contraction of PSR restricts its domain, PSR enjoys with respect to that domain the 
same kind of absolute metaphysical validity as it enjoyed (with respect to being in general) for 
Spinoza and Leibniz. In this unexpected way, Schopenhauer's development of Kant's transcendental 
idealism, which he intended as a radical alternative to the Fichte-Schelling form of post-
Kantianism, ends up, in the respect indicated, firmly on their side.95 
 
If the difficulties I have indicated are genuine, then Schopenhauer's deconstruction of German 
Idealism does not succeed. To press the point home: It is a consequence of the foregoing that the 
very charges that Schopenhauer lays against Schelling can be levelled against his own system. 
Schopenhauer repudiates the intellectually intuited 'indifference point' of Schelling's identity 
philosophy, claiming that Schelling's positing of an absolute unity of the subjective and the 
                                                     
95 This result is not so surprising, when we recall Schopenhauer's alignment of Kant's idealism with 
that of Berkeley (WWR I, 434–435, 444; WWR II, 8), whose idealism is by Kant's lights a form of 
transcendental realism. The point can thus be put as follows. Schopenhauer makes clear that his 
understanding of Erscheinung takes an extra, Berkeleyan step beyond Kant's (VgP, 482–489), and 
because for Schopenhauer the subject-object relation is one of bare Korrelation, and the object's 
existence consists in its relatedness to the subject (as it does for Berkeley), our mode of cognition, 
Erkenntnisart, is for Schopenhauer not a (merely formal) condition to which objects are subject and 
hence relativized in so far as they are cognized (as it is for Kant), but an (unrelativized) ontological 
component of those objects (as they are an sich). 
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objective violates the principle of contradiction and results in mere pseudo-concepts.96 But if 
Schopenhauer requires us to think the world as a superimposition of two dissociated conceptions, 
then he puts us in the same position as that which he criticizes in Schelling. The 'either-or, neither-
nor, both-and' character of Schelling's point of indifference is reproduced in the structure of 
Schopenhauer's system, which hinges on a supposition of the very same order – namely, that Wille 
can both be and not be the world as representation. The same combination of conjunction and 
exclusive disjunction is involved. The difference from Schelling is only that Schopenhauer has not 
made the supposition formally explicit, and chooses to describe our knowledge of the coming 
together of Wille and the world as representation as mere 'negative knowledge'.97 But again it does 
not look as if the negative character of our knowledge creates a real difference: Schopenhauer may 
not talk of a faculty of intellectual intuition, or develop a theory of construction in concepts, but still 
he must posit a capacity to grasp in some manner the nexus of Wille and representation, on pain of 
foregoing the claim that philosophical knowledge is involved here at all.98 
 
III.  The post-Schopenhauerian development 
 
                                                     
96 E.g., MRCD, 342, 359–360, 371–373, 391, and WWR I, 26. Schopenhauer is on weak ground 
here, in so far as his own claim to possess the concepts of object, subject, and Korrelation, which 
define the sphere within which PSR operates, appears to assume intellectual intuition or its 
equivalent. 
97 WWR I, 410; WWR II, 612. 
98 It is highly significant in this context that Schopenhauer describes Kant's account of intellectual 
intuition in §76 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement – passages inspirational for the German 
Idealists, and which, one might think, Schopenhauer ought to have dismissed as one of Kant's 
regrettable errors – as 'the pith of the Kantian philosophy' (MRCD, 326–327). 
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I want now to look at the post-Schopenhauerian development, with a view to showing how it bears 
witness to the problem created by his contraction of PSR, and to charting Schopenhauer's influence 
on late nineteenth-century philosophy. Distinguished below are five systematic possibilities, 
mapped onto actual historical developments.99 Each represents a different move that, it may be 
thought, Schopenhauer may or should make in response to the difficulties generated by his attempt 
to persevere with substantive metaphysical claims while contracting reason. In each case I will note 
very briefly its arguable limitation from Schopenhauer's perspective or a problem that it encounters. 
 
1. Modifying German Idealism from within: late Schelling 
 
Schelling's late philosophy is of course not a development of Schopenhauer's philosophy but an 
independent development within German Idealism, which was already underway, though it had not 
come to completion, by the time Schopenhauer came on the German philosophical scene.100 It 
merits consideration here nonetheless, in so far as the late Schelling may be regarded as attempting 
to modify German Idealism in a way that incorporates the conviction at the root of Schopenhauer's 
project: Schelling had in clear view from 1804 onwards the very problem that appears to mark the 
limit of Schopenhauer's philosophical system, namely how to express and explain, in discursive 
terms and with reasoned justification, the failure of the real to be the rational. 
 In his Essay on Human Freedom of 1809 Schelling tries to revise the system of idealism in a 
way that will accommodate the possibility of evil, something which, he argues, Kant, Fichte and by 
implication his own earlier forms of idealism had precluded. This involves Schelling in rethinking 
the Absolute, or God, as primordially will, without conceptual form or understanding, 'blind 
                                                     
99 I provide only selective coverage; for a comprehensive view of Schopenhauer's influence and 
successors, see Fabio Ciracì, Domenico M. Fazio, and Matthias Koßler (eds.), Schopenhauer und 
die Schopenhauer-Schule (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2009). 
100 See note 59 above. 
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longing'. Reason, on this account, is something that comes to be, in and through God's volitional 
self-realization. The pattern mirrors Schopenhauer: first there is will, then there is the space of 
reasons; and the possibility of evil derives from the 'excess' of reality over reason, the residue of 
non-rational will carried over into rationally formed reality.101 What might be claimed therefore is 
that, though Schopenhauer's reassertion of the unsolved problem of evil poses a challenge which the 
incurably optimistic systems of Fichte and Hegel cannot meet, the challenge is eventually met by 
Schelling. 
 The notion that Schelling takes the wind out of Schopenhauer's sails encounters, however, 
the following obstacle. True to Kant, Schelling identifies evil as such with human moral evil – and 
this allows Schopenhauer to grant for the sake of argument that Schelling's revision to German 
Idealism might account for the evil that enters the world through human action, while denying that 
it does anything to acknowledge the evil which is written into the fabric of the world (the evil 
                                                     
101 The details of the later Schelling's view of reason do not belong here, but it is worth indicating 
the basic difference between his and Schopenhauer's respective contractions of PSR. This may be 
viewed in terms of their different attitudes to the thesis of the absolute identity of being and 
knowing maintained in Schelling's identity philosophy of 1801–02. This Schopenhauer simply 
negates by asserting its antithesis, i.e., that being (in itself) and knowing are absolutely alien to one 
another. Schelling by contrast thereafter continues to regard the identity thesis as containing truth, 
but not as ontologically primary, the important point being that, though the domain conforming to 
PSR is ultimately restricted, Schelling regards it as intelligibly continuous with its pre-rational 
ground. Thus in the Freiheitsschrift, Schelling locates the birth of reason in God's self-grounding, to 
which it is related teleologically (Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, 
p. 30). In his later philosophy of revelation, the relation between PSR and what lies outside it is 
formulated in terms of the (again intelligible and ultimately complementary) relation of negative to 
positive philosophy: see The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures [1842–43], 
trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), esp. pp. 127–154. 
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which, to take an example from a relevant context, incites Adrian Leverkühn to take back the Ninth 
Symphony).102 
 
The following four neo-Schopenhauerian developments divide into two groups, according to 
whether they either approach Schopenhauer from the angle of German Idealism and attempt to 
resolve the tension in his system by working it into that context, or on the contrary propose to cut 
him loose from it. The pair comprising the first group can be described as 'metaphilosophically 
realist', in the sense that they regard Schopenhauer's metaphysical claims as aiming at plain 
theoretical truth (in accord with Schopenhauer's own view of their logical character) and as having 
immodest, non-Kantian, absolutist import. They subscribe accordingly to what I called 
Schopenhauer's 'Western'/metaphysical model, eschewing the illusionistic dimension of 
Schopenhauer's treatment of empirical reality. 
 
2. Union with Hegel: Eduard von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious 
 
Eduard von Hartmann regards Schopenhauer's attempt to annex a metaphysics of will to empirical 
reality as essentially correct, but as suffering principally from the defect that Schopenhauer fails to 
explain how conceptual structure enters the picture. The teleological metaphysics of Hartmann's 
Philosophy of the Unconscious, published in 1869, grounds natural phenomena in a manifold of 
unconscious acts of will, unified ultimately under the single act of will which he calls the (All-One) 
Unconscious. Thus far Hartmann is following, and developing, Schopenhauer's line in On the Will 
in Nature. Hartmann departs from Schopenhauer, however, by interpreting the teleological 
metaphysics of nature as revealing the existence of an original synthesis of Hegel's Idee and 
                                                     
102 Whether the objection succeeds depends on whether Schelling's suggestion that man's moral evil 
infects creation at large can be sustained: see Michelle Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, 
Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 103–104. 
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Schopenhauer's alogical Wille, the dual equiprimordial constituents of reality. Nature falls out of 
their union: the Idee furnishes natural kinds and the order of nature, while Wille gives these actual 
existence, bringing to life and imparting movement to Hegel's ghostly edifice. 
 The broad philosophical significance of his Philosophy of the Unconscious, Hartmann 
explains, is that it comprises an overcoming of the antinomy formed by Hegel and Schopenhauer, 
yielding a super-system in which their respective deficiencies are corrected: the Schopenhauerian 
element allows Hegel to answer the familiar charge of panlogicism, while Hegel provides the 
ideational structure which Schopenhauer is unable to account for.103 
 The crucial, striking element in Hartmann's neo-Schopenhauerian metaphysics is the notion 
of an absolutely original, unconditioned union of Idee and Wille. This presents the following 
difficulty. The union is either rational or not, but if it is not, then it is impossible to understand how 
Idee can be affected by Wille, while if it is, then Wille must lie already within the space of reasons. 
It seems that, if the union is possible, then Wille must be proto-ideational and Idee must be proto-
volitional; in which case their union amounts to the actualization of each through the other, their 
mutual realization in a hylomorphic relationship (suggesting, perhaps, that Idee and Wille cannot 
after all be absolutely primitive). This might be counted an interesting new addition to the 
neoplatonic canon, and it is arguably the position that Hartmann ought to have taken, but it is not, in 
fact, how he wishes to conceive matters: the Idee-Wille synthesis, Hartmann maintains, is indeed 
                                                     
103 For a selection of Hartmann's criticisms of Schopenhauer, see Eduard von Hartmann, Philosophy 
of the Unconscious: Speculative Results According to the Inductive Method of Physical Science [1st 
edn., 1869], trans. William Chatterton Coupland (from the 9th edn, 1882) (London: Kegan Paul, 
1931), Vol. I, pp. 29–31, pp. 117–119; Vol. II, pp. 101–102, pp. 339–343; and Vol. III, pp. 149–
151. Hartmann reads the Hegel-Schopenhauer relation through the lens of Schelling's distinction of 
negative and positive philosophy, Hegel supplying the Was or Wie of things and Schopenhauer the 
Daß. To that extent, Hartmann's manoeuvres may be viewed as an exploration of the first option, 
i.e., as resolving Schopenhauer into late Schelling. 
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unintelligible; we must regard it as an error or wrong,104 that can be characterized only in quasi-
mythic terms (on the model of sexual union).105 And with this it becomes clear that, contrary to the 
expectations raised by talk of a Hegel-Schopenhauer synthesis, Hartmann has not eased the tension 
present in Schopenhauer concerning the relation of Wille to PSR, nor has he intended to do so: 
rather he has singled it out, theorized it explicitly, and reaffirmed it at the apex of his system. The 
gain in explicitness is however offset – from Schopenhauer's point of view – by the way in which 
Hartmann's reconfiguration appears to remove irrationality from the world and relocate it outside, in 
its mere ontological antecedents. 
 
3. Schopenhauer in the language of Hegel: Julius Bahnsen's Realdialektik 
 
Whereas Hartmann aims to fortify Schopenhauer's system by melding it with Hegel's, his 
contemporary Julius Bahnsen recasts Schopenhauer's central ideas in the terms of Hegel's dialectic. 
 According to Bahnsen, there are, as Hegel says, contradictions in reality – the blame for 
antinomy falls on the object, not the thinking subject – but these are, as per Schopenhauer, 
functions of its character as Wille, not of an autonomous dynamic of the Begriff. The contradictions 
arise because will inherently contradicts itself – to will is to will not-to-will: every desire aims at its 
own extinction. The space of reasons just is the appearing (Schein) of the self-contradicting activity 
of Wille, and PSR the 'law' which governs it.106 Because conceptuality is nothing over and above 
Wille's manifestation of its self-negating essence, there is nothing within it, no potential for 
autonomy, that could lead to an overcoming of the world's constitutive contradictions. Whereas 
Hartmann marries Wille with reason, its ontological equal, Bahnsen's more authentically 
                                                     
104 Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. II, p. 273, and Vol. III, pp. 124–125. 
105 Hartmann, Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. II, Ch. XV, Sect. 2. 
106 Julius Bahnsen, Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt. Princip und Einzelbewährung 
der Realdialektik (Berlin: Grieben, 1880), p. 206. 
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Schopenhauerian approach reduces reason to Wille; again, whereas Hartmann concedes to Hegel 
the genuinely rational character of reality as given to us, Bahnsen follows Schopenhauer in 
ascribing an irrational character to the conceptually formed world. Pessimism, the defence of which 
(as noted above) presents Hartmann with a difficulty, is thus firmly reinstated.107 
 Bahnsen's metaphysics lacks nothing in strangeness, yet may be regarded as again a 
consistent development from Schopenhauerian premises. Bahnsen's original contribution to neo-
Schopenhauerianism lies in his substitution for the antagonism of PSR with Wille a primordial 
antagonism within Wille itself. This facilitates what Schopenhauer denied to be possible, viz., a 
grounding of PSR, thereby converting Schopenhauer's absolute dualism into an absolute monism. In 
a supreme reversal of Wolff, PSR is derived from a principle of self-contradiction. 
 Of greatest importance for present purposes, however, is Bahnsen's novel articulation of 
Schopenhauer's core thesis. Bahnsen takes from Hartmann a term that is absent from Schopenhauer, 
antilogisch, in order to characterize the essence of Wille.108 He does so because he wishes to 
conceive Wille not as merely outside reason in the familiar and innocuous sense in which for bald 
naturalists nature and efficient natural causality lie outside the space of reasons, but as contrary or 
antagonistic to reason.109 This notion makes sense, however, only if Wille's opposition to reason is a 
                                                     
107 Bahnsen, Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, p. 210. Hartmann's case for 
pessimism is made in Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. III, Ch. XIII. 
108 Hartmann denies that the will as such is anti-logical; it is merely alogical, and becomes anti-
logical only in its act (Philosophy of the Unconscious, Vol. III, pp. 124–125). 
109 This is made clear in Bahnsen, Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, p. 6: In 
Objektivdialektik 'it is a matter not just of the conflict of the laws of thought with one another, but 
of a conflict of the laws of reality on the one hand with one another and on the other with the laws 
of thought'; the dialectical character of the relation between elements in reality (gedachten Realen) 
– not insofar as they are contained in subjective thought but insofar as they stand in objectivity – is 
the same as that which can obtain between thoughts, 'namely one of contradiction'. It is on this basis 
43 
 
relation distinct from opposition in the material sense of conflicting causality, e.g., the clash of 
physical forces, which is merely alogical or non-logical. The relation must instead comprise, or 
have a character akin to, logical opposition. The only thing that can be thought to stand opposed to 
logic as such is contradiction, the Contradictory. Bahnsen's Antilogische provides for this not 
through dialetheism, the true conjunction of contradictory assertoric propositions, but through 
contradiction in will: performative, as opposed to constative, contradiction. Bahnsen's Wille thus 
opposes reason in the mode of refuting or falsifying it, by dint of the fact that reality as a whole and 
in all of its individual forms – all possible candidates for satisfying or exemplifying reason – has in 
essence the nature of an impossible undertaking (a striving with the incoherent content: 'to will-not-
to-will'). 
 Bahnsen's Realdialektik unpacks and sharpens Schopenhauer's claim that Wille is 'foreign' to 
PSR, but makes no advance with the problem that we have been tracking in Schopenhauer. 
According to Realdialektik, the relation of thought to reality too must exhibit contradiction, 
meaning that no philosophical system which grasps reality adequately can give a full and complete 
account of its capacity to do so; Bahnsen's claim to knowledge of the self-contradictory essence of 
Wille is no less precarious than Schopenhauer's claim to knowledge of the grounding of the world in 
Wille.110 
 
Hartmann and Bahnsen give a fair idea of what can be done with Schopenhauer by reworking his 
thought in the terms of German Idealism. The alternative is to abandon the aspiration to plain 
theoretical truth. This may be buttressed by the suggestion that just as, according to Schopenhauer, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
that Bahnsen differentiates his Realdialektik from Hegel's merely subjective, 'verbal', 'pseudo' 
dialectic.  
110 Which is not to say that Bahnsen fails to engage with epistemology: in the first part of Volume I 
of Der Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, 'Das antilogische Princip: Einleitung in die 
Realdialektik', Bahnsen tries to show that his system avoids self-refutation. 
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Kant allowed the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy which comprised his proximate target to 
condition and compromise his own system,111 so Schopenhauer, too much under the spell of the 
idea of Philosophy-as-System, made the same mistake with respect to German Idealism. Two such 
'metaphilosophically anti-realist' construals of Schopenhauer's philosophy suggest themselves. They 
are independent but not exclusive, and both are associated with Nietzsche. 
 
4. 'Aestheticist' reconstrual of Schopenhauer 
 
If Schopenhauer's system cannot lay claim to theoretical truth, it may still be construed expressively 
or aesthetically, or perhaps as a case of 'showing' what cannot be said, and in such terms a species 
of validity claimed for it. Whether or not such an approach counts as a poor second best, or entails a 
complete abandonment of cognitive ambition, will depend upon what general view is taken of the 
significance of aesthetic presentations and of the capacity of philosophical thought to attain 
theoretical truth; in the case of Wittgenstein's rendering of Schopenhauer's insights in the Tractatus, 
for example, it is not at all clear that cognitive inferiority is implied. 
 An anti-realist understanding of Schopenhauer underlies Nietzsche's non-committal use of 
his metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy, where the Schopenhauerian dissolution of nature into a 
trans-phenomenal will is compared to a 'light-image [Lichtbild] that healing nature holds up to us 
after we have glimpsed the abyss'.112 Though Schopenhauer himself barely wavers in his 
commitment to the unqualified truth of his system, there are moments when his concept empiricism 
may seem to draw him in such a direction – philosophy is described as merely depositing in 
concepts 'a reflected image [reflektirtes Abbild]' of the inner nature of the world.113 
                                                     
111 MRCD, 310; WWR I, 418; WWR II, 582. 
112 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music [1872], trans. Shaun 
Whiteside, ed. Michael Tanner (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), §9, 47. 
113 WWR I, 384. Or, again, as an 'Abspiegelung der Welt, in abstrakten Begriffe', VgP, 571. 
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 One way of developing this line in Schopenhauer's own terms would be to claim that his 
philosophical system stands in the same sort of relation to man, or the human condition, as a work 
of art does to the Idea that it realizes. Since tragedy is for Schopenhauer the form of art that 
expresses most perfectly the Idea of man,114 Schopenhauer's metaphysics would count as a 
theorization not essentially different from a tragic work but simply more abstract. The measure of 
the success of his system would consist, at least in part, in the application of criteria appropriate to a 
work of art – verisimilitude, resonance, hermeneutic traction, and so on. That Schopenhauer's 
philosophy lends itself readily to such a perspective is testified by its extraordinary track record of 
literary inspiration. 
 The essential point at any rate is that if Schopenhauer's metaphysics of Wille are viewed 
aesthetically, then they are discharged from the task of explanation: the distinction between 
answering and simply evoking the 'riddle of the world' disappears, and with it the tension created by 
his contraction of PSR. Also affected, however, is Schopenhauer's axiological conviction: that the 
world is intrinsically and positively evil must now be regarded as something other than a 
straightforward fact about its nature. 
 
5. 'Practicalist' reconstrual of Schopenhauer: Nietzsche 
 
Nietzscheans may welcome the earlier conclusion that Schopenhauer fails in his endeavour to 
deconstruct German Idealism as showing the necessity of taking a greater initial distance from the 
legacy of idealism in order to overcome it. Nietzsche's own deconstruction of Schopenhauer's 
pessimism is well-known and needs only brief rehearsal. According to Nietzsche, what it means for 
the will or the practical to have primacy is not just for the intellect to be, as a factual matter, 
causally subordinate to the will, à la Freud. Certainly it entails that philosophical thought should 
reflect on its own motivation, but more deeply it means, metaphilosophically, that values, taken to 
                                                     
114 WWR I, 252. 
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be themselves non-metaphysical, replace metaphysical truth-claims in our understanding of the 
practical, and that philosophical reflection makes legitimate appeal to values in determining how to 
conceptualize the world. Practical orientation is understood with indifference to metaphysical 
questions (thus to some extent in a more Kantian way), and henceforth depth psychology replaces 
metaphysics in providing practical and axiological guidance. And this practical turn can be given a 
Schopenhauerian justification: Nietzsche's contention is that if the contraction of PSR is carried 
through consistently (and on his account there is further to go in dethroning reason) then practical 
and axiological concerns cannot be regarded any longer as topics in, or as subject to the authority 
of, metaphysics. 
 In this light, Nietzsche argues, Schopenhauer's own ground floor conviction that evil has 
positive reality must be re-examined, from which it emerges that this metaphysical judgement is a 
mere symptom of a defective constitution, lacking in truth and expressive of a stance towards the 
world which has no privileged rationality. Nietzsche thus converts Schopenhauer's categorical 
judgement that the world is evil, is such that it ought not to be, into an act of will, a bare imperative 
of world-rejection. The respective claims of optimism and pessimism, keenly debated in the late 
nineteenth century, form for Nietzsche an antinomy resting on a false presupposition, and its 
dissolution opens up new horizons. 
 
Both the realist and the anti-realist developments can claim to stay true to the spirit of 
Schopenhauer's project; Hartmann and Bahnsen may be regarded as restoring it to its terminus ad 
quo, and Nietzsche as articulating its terminus ad quem. The latter is doubtless more congenial to us 
now, but its limitation – again, from Schopenhauer's point of view – is worth noting. What holds 
Schopenhauer within metaphysics is not a failure to grasp the possibility of saying farewell to the 
whole business of trying to say something about the essence of the world: the basis for that post-
metaphysical option is set out clearly in Fourfold Root. The reason why Schopenhauer does not take 
it is that the evil of existence is, for him, a hard fact, a fact so hard that only the thing in itself can do 
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justice to its reality. From this angle, the primary task, the difficulty of which was not lost on 
Nietzsche, is to persuade Schopenhauer out of his conviction of the theoretical character of his 
insight; in other words, to demonstrate that the anti-realist reconstrual does not – as it will appear to 
Schopenhauer – amount to a loss of reality and betrayal of his insight. 
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